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Abstract
Never in the history of the world has so much trust been given to something that so few understand. Jeff
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October 2019
I thought I understood the scope of this presentation.  I was wrong.  
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End User Licensing 
Agreement
This is an agreement between the presenter, Jeff, and the 
audience, you.  Jeff is  not responsible for anything said, 
implied, gestured or presented in any way.  You are 
responsible for incredibly undivided attention and loud 
rousing applause during and at the end of the presentation.  
Any semblance of this security presentation to an actual 
security presentation should be considered coincidental.  
Your silence will be considered as an acceptance of this 
agreement.   
All opinions, beliefs, statements, and material in this presentation reflect 
my own personal beliefs and do not reflect the opinions or beliefs of my 
employer.
I don’t read my slides.

My deck is more for those that see it without listening to me

I’ve put a lot sources for each slide in the notes.  
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Autobiography
▸ Emory University BA Sociology 
▸ Southern Polytechnic State 
University BS CpET-Controls 
▸ Recent Work History 
▸ Internal Consultant/Application 
Security and Project Review 
▸ Threat Intelligence/Level 3 
Incident Response 
▸ Threat Hunter
Some of these slides are a wall of text.  They are meant more to be like images showing the volume of the topic I’m discussing.  The content is legitimate, but don’t 
assume I’m going to review the details.  If you are interested, please download and review later.  

I have to leave after this presentation so I won’t be around for questions.

My email is ……. Or you can get my contact info from Herb Mattord.  
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A Few Questions First
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Who believes that at some point in the 
future there will be a great cyber war?
US destroying Iran’s missile defense computers, NotPetya, Ukraine power station attacks, Iran centrifuges destroyed, Iran DDoSed banks
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Who believes that this war will NOT 
be limited to only military targets 
and include civilian targets?
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Who believes that if there were a great 
cyber war that critical infrastructure 
like electrical power, commerce, 
satellites, etc… will have limited or 
no functionality?
Could a satellite be directed out of orbit to bomb a city?
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Who believes that during a great 
cyber war that civilians like 
Anonymous, cybercriminals, bot 
herders, and countless other civilian 
hackers will engage in rouge cyber 
attacks?
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If most of us agree that this is an 
eventuality, what is being done to 
prevent it?
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The people who write the software for 
the Internet are the most critical in 
preventing attacks.   
How many classes on writing secure 
code are required at your schools? 
Why is an Introduction to Security 
not required for all students?
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Is your university or college involved 
in the organizations that set the 
standards for Internet 
communications like the IETF and 
CA/B Forum?
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Are Students Being 
Prepared for this 
Eventuality?
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Internet Security
Where are we and where are we going?
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This presentation is in no 
way meant to be an attack 
on any group or individual   
The goal is to raise 
awareness to bring about 
a more secure, 
trustworthy internet
Making changes to the Internet now is like fixing a car with the engine running!
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Internet Core Functions
• Domain Name System 
• Digital Certificates 
• Border Gateway Protocol
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DNS
• Why was DNS created? 
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• Zone file compromise

• Zone information leakage

• Compromised dynamic updates
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DNS Security Extensions 
(DNSSEC)
• Published by IEFT in 2005 with first work started in 
1993 
• Origin authentication of  DNS data 
• Data integrity 
• Authenticated denial of  existence 
• Does not protect against 




DNSSEC adds four new resource record types: 

• Resource Record Signature (RRSIG), 

• DNS Public Key (DNSKEY), 

• Delegation Signer (DS),

• Next Secure (NSEC). 

It also adds two new DNS header flags: 

• Checking Disabled (CD)
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Issues with DNSSEC
• RFC 3833 - Issues with DNSSEC 
• Published a year before the DNSSEC RFCs in 2004 
• Eight major issues identified 
• Debilitating requirements of  DNSSEC design were all data would 
remain “public” and no authentication of  clients or servers for access 
control 
• Extremely complex to implement and maintain 
• Time synchronization issues 
• Resource intensive 
• Key rollover is very hard 
• Not widely deployed due to issues
19
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DNS Security Reboot
• DNS over TLS (DoT) 
• RFC7858 - Standards Track May 2016 
• Unique Port and Allows Inspection 
• DNS over HTTPS (DoH) 
• RFC8484 - Standards Track Oct 2018 
• Uses Web Traffic and Supports an Open Internet 
• Overrides OS resolution for browser’s choice 
• DNS over DTLS  
• RFC8094 - Experimental Feb 2017 
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DNS-over-HTTPS
• DoH is the leading standard 
• Firefox turned on DoH in late September 2019 
• Only works over Cloudflare for now 
• Chrome has a Beta DoH and Already Exploited 
• ProofPoint found: 
PsiXBot have now chosen Google's DoH service for routing their DNS 
queries to return the IP addresses of the C&C domains. By using 
Google’s DoH service, it allows attackers to hide the DNS query to the 
C&C domain behind HTTPS.
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Issues with DoH
According to ZDNet from 6 October 2019 
• DoH doesn't actually prevent ISPs user tracking 
• DoH creates havoc in the enterprise sector 
• DoH weakens cyber-security 
• DoH helps criminals 
• DoH shouldn't be recommended to dissidents 
• DoH centralizes DNS traffic at a few DoH resolvers 
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• General Data Protection Regulation is an EU 
regulation created to protect European citizens from 
unwanted personal data collection and potential misuse 
of  this data.   
• An unfortunate side effect of  this regulation is Security’s 
ability to identify, monitory, and stop threat actors. 
• WhoIs is a standard developed to allow people on the 
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Registrar of Record: TUCOWS, INC.
Record last updated on 01-Jan-2008.
Record expires on 01-Jan-2009.
Record created on 01-Jan-2008.
Registrar Domain Name Help Center:
http://domainhelp.tucows.com






Threat actors would usually reuse the same contact info for their different attacks.  WhoIs helped Security identify and stop attacks.
24




        marconi.co.uk
    Data validation:
        Nominet was able to match the registrant's name and address against a 3rd 
party data source on 11-Jul-2017
    Registrar:
        GoDaddy.com, LLC. t/a GoDaddy.com, LLC. [Tag = GODADDYUK] [Tag = GODADDYUK]
        URL: http://uk.godaddy.com
    Relevant dates:
        Registered on: 08-Sep-1998
        Expiry date:  08-Sep-2020
        Last updated:  22-Sep-2019
    Registration status:
        Registered until expiry date.
    Name servers:
        ns17.domaincontrol.com
        ns18.domaincontrol.com
    WHOIS lookup made at 17:57:18 28-Sep-2019
•
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GDPR/WhoIs Security 
Ideas
• Use tokens to identify owner information 
• Require verification of  people making the requests 
• DNS would have different levels of  verification 
like certificates
26
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DNS Conclusions
• There are a lot of  security issues with DNS 
• The new standards and regulations favor privacy 
over security 
• DoH is being deployed by browser organizations 
• Most people do not understand the difference or 
believe it matters 
• Changing how DNS works involves a lot of  
complicated changes and effort
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Certificates
• Why were certificates created? 
• Common Uses 
• Encrypt communications 
• Web 
• Email 






• Zone file compromise

• Zone information leakage

• Compromised dynamic updates











• Domain owner validation 
• (See next slides) 
• Certificate impersonations 
• Original certificates 
• Symantec vs. Google example 
• Similar certificates 










https://blog.appsecco.com/certificate-transparency-the-bright-side-and-the-dark-side-8aa47d9a6616    

In December, 2013, Google announced that they noticed unauthorized digital certificates issued for several Google domains by an intermediate CA linking back to 
ANSSI, a French Certificate Authority(that operates with French intelligence agencies). The ANSSI attributed the incident to “Human Error”. Google pointed out the 
importance of CT in that announcement.

    In December, 2012, Google announced that they noticed unauthorized digital certificates issued for “*.google.com” domain by an intermediate CA linking back to 
TURKTRUST, a Turkish certificate authority. Google detected the issue using Chrome’s certificate pinning(Certificate Pinning is a mechanism by which applications 
indicate that only specific CAs are allowed to issue certificates on their behalf).

    In August, 2011, Google announced that they noticed fraudulent SSL certificate issued by DigiNotar, a root certificate authority that should not issue certificates for 
Google. Attackers compromised DigiNotar’s infrastructure to issue hundreds of unauthorised digital certificates.
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Types of Validation
Note: Validation methods must work in all countries 
• DV - Domain Validation 
• Verifies the DNS owner 
• OV - Organization Validation 
• Verifies the organization/business 
• Organizations are strictly authenticated by real agents against 
business registry databases hosted by governments.   
• EV - Extended Validation 
• Extra validation steps 










Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of  Publicly-Trusted Certificates 
Validation of  Domain Authorization or Control (Pick one) 
3.2.2.4.1 Validating the Applicant as a Domain Contact* 
3.2.2.4.2 Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain Contact 
3.2.2.4.3 Phone Contact with Domain Contact 
3.2.2.4.4 Constructed Email to Domain Contact 
3.2.2.4.5 Domain Authorization Document* 
3.2.2.4.6 Agreed‐Upon Change to Website 
3.2.2.4.7 DNS Change 
3.2.2.4.8 IP Address 
3.2.2.4.9 Test Certificate 
3.2.2.4.10. TLS Using a Random Number 
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EV Certificate 
Validation Deep Dive
• Verify Applicant’s existence and identity 
• Verify the Applicant’s legal existence and identity 
• Verify the Applicant’s physical existence (business presence at a physical address) 
• Verify the Applicant’s operational existence (business activity) 
• Verify the Applicant is a registered holder, or has control, of  the Domain Name(s) to be included in 
the EV Certificate 
• Verify a reliable means of  communication with the entity to be named as the Subject in the 
Certificate 
• Verify the Applicant’s authorization for the EV Certificate 
• Verify the name, title, and authority of  the Contract Signer, Certificate Approver, and Certificate 
Requester 
• Verify that a Contract Signer signed the Subscriber Agreement or that a duly authorized Applicant 
Representative acknowledged and agreed to the Terms of  Use 
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User Verification of 
Certificate
• Most people do not understand the difference 
between DV, OV, or EV 
• Most people click through certificate error 
messages 
• The URL bar has started showing green, but do 
people notice when it is not green
33
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Certificate Solutions
• Certificate pinning 
• Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) 
• Certificate Transparency (CT) 
• But who is checking? 
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About the new TLS 1.3 
standard
• Utilizes unique encryption for every connection.   
• PFS - Perfect Forward Secrecy in Diffie-Hellman 
• Ephemeral-Mode 
• Elliptic-Curve 
• The private certificate keys cannot be utilized to break the encryption 
• Good: Limits the ability of  repressive countries from monitoring and 
controlling people 
• Bad: Organizations cannot utilize their own certificates to inspect traffic to 
protect themselves 
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Digital Certificate 
Conclusions
• There has been a lot of  progress recently 
• There are still some large and very complicated 
challenges 
• Any solution must work and be accepted 
worldwide 
• The combination of  TLS 1.3 and DoH creates 
new attack vectors for Security organizations
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Border Gateway Protocol
• Why was BGP created? 
• What is BGP used for? 
• BGPv4 in use since 1994 
• RFC 4271 in 2006
37
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BGP Issues
Attacks according to NIST 800-54: 
• Peer Spoofing and TCP Resets 
• TCP Resets Using ICMP 
• Session Hijacking 
• Route Flapping 
• Route Deaggregation 
• Malicious Route Injection 
• Unallocated Route Injection 
• Denial of  Service via Resource Exhaustion 
• Link Cutting Attack
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-54.pdf
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GBP Summary
Natively BGP is… 
• “Open”/Trusting/Not Centralized 
• Quick to reconverge 
• Falt tolerant 
• Not country specific i.e. “borderless” 
• Passively monitored.  Not policed. 
• Only deeply understood by very few people. 
• Classic case of  fast and easy vs. security dichotomy.
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BGP Solutions
• BGPsec - RFC 8205 Proposed Standard Sept 2017 
• Resource intensive - not well supported 
• TCP MD5 Password - RFC 2385 (1998) 
• Mitigates BGP session hijacking  
• Not widely implemented 
• Route Origin Validation - NIST 800-14 June 2019 
• New and shows promise 
• More of  a best practice document 
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Summary
• Security needs to become more involved in the 
standardization process 
• Non-security people need to learn about security 
• Security needs to become more proactive and not 
reactive 
• Think more strategically than tactically 
• Security needs to focus more than just on how things break 





• Zone file compromise

• Zone information leakage

• Compromised dynamic updates
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Topics of Discussion
• Why do people trust a car mechanic more than 
Security people? 
• There is no CISO for the whole world 
• What is the largest group that speaks for Security? 
• If  everyone knew what Security people knew, would 
they behave differently? 
• What can universities do to train the next 
generation of  cyber warriors? 
• Blockchain classes?
AMA, ADA, Bar Association, 
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